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Abstract— Vehicles with Automated Driving Systems (ADS)
operate in a high-dimensional continuous system with multi-
agent interactions. This continuous system features vari-
ous types of traffic agents (non-homogeneous) governed by
continuous-motion ordinary differential equations (differential-
drive). Each agent makes decisions independently that may
lead to conflicts with the subject vehicle (SV), as well as
other participants (non-cooperative). A typical vehicle safety
evaluation procedure that uses various safety-critical scenarios
and observes resultant collisions (or near collisions), is not
sufficient enough to evaluate the performance of the ADS
in terms of operational safety status maintenance. In this
paper, we introduce a Model Predictive Instantaneous Safety
Metric (MPrISM), which determines the safety status of the SV,
considering the worst-case safety scenario for a given traffic
snapshot. The method then analyzes the SV’s closeness to a
potential collision within a certain evaluation time period. The
described metric induces theoretical guarantees of safety in
terms of the time to collision under standard assumptions.
Through formulating the solution as a series of minimax
quadratic optimization problems of a specific structure, the
method is tractable for real-time safety evaluation applications.
Its capabilities are demonstrated with synthesized examples and
cases derived from real-world tests.
I. INTRODUCTION
Automated Driving Systems (ADSs) operate in a high-
dimensional state space with various types of other traffic
agents. While the instantaneous states of each agent, including
location, velocity and the type of agent may be accessible
through perfect perception and communication, the actual
motion trajectory carried out by each agent is largely unknown
and occasionally random. A pedestrian could cross the street
without the presence of a green traffic light or cross walk [1],
a lead-vehicle could perform abrupt maximum braking for
collision avoidance, people could start chasing a bird in the
middle of the road [2], to name a few.
For the intelligent subject vehicle (SV) to safely navigate in
such a complex environment, it must maintain a certain level
of control over the outcome even when presented with the
worst possible scenario. A way to evaluate safety performance,
then, is through exposing the SV to various safety-critical
scenarios and observing the resultant consequences, e.g.,
whether a collision occurs. Conflict severity based on the
instantaneous vehicle states like Time to Collision (TTC) [3]
is also included when applicable. Historically, TTC is
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the dominant metric in analyzing the safety of intelligent
longitudinal control systems [4], [5]. Notice that some variants
of TTC also incorporate probabilistic risk assessment [6], and
consider the capability of SV in avoiding potential collisions
by incorporating extreme evasive maneuvers [7].
However, the safety evaluation of ADS fundamentally
presents two unique challenges to the described process. First,
for safety assessment within a high-dimensional continuous
domain, simply observing collisions is no longer sufficient.
Even if no collision is encountered, a highly automated
driving algorithm can still decide to drive aggressively through
crowded traffic, experiencing various near-miss scenarios. An
adequate metric for safety evaluation and conflict assessment
should be able to distinguish such a risky algorithm from
conservative ones analytically. Second, the ADS is capable
of operating both longitudinally and laterally with intelligent
decision making and control. Previous analyses, such as TTC,
are restricted to a small subset of all possible scenarios. On
the other hand, if we consider the full actuation capabilities
within the complete Euclidean operable domain, it would
lead to a complex strategy for both the traffic agent to initiate
a dangerous situation and the SV to guarantee its escape cor-
respondingly. Only considering extreme longitudinal evasive
maneuvers (e.g., maximum braking) is no longer sufficient to
justify the safety status of the SV over the potential roadway
area occupied in multi-agent interactions.
In this paper, we formulate the safety evaluation problem
within a general multi-agent system of various types of
agents (non-homogeneous) following independent control and
planning strategies (non-cooperative) with continuous motion
governed by ordinary differential equations (differential-drive).
For an arbitrary agent selected as the SV, we introduce the
Model Predictive Instantaneous Safety Metric (MPrISM) that
seeks to determine its instantaneous capability of getting away
from a potential collision under standard assumptions. It can
also be interpreted as a high-dimensional model predictive
TTC metric. The metric considers the full control authority
of the SV and the traffic agent, along with game interaction
between them to estimate the time-to-collision when the traffic
agent takes the most aggressive action to cause a crash as
the SV tries its best to avoid it. This is in contrast to the
classic TTC calculation considering only the longitudinal
states of all traffic participants with the strong assumption of
all agents maintaining the current velocity and orientation for
all time. The described method is particularly effective in the
safety evaluation of ADS given its analytical form of solving
a series of minimax quadratic optimization problems subject
to linear constraints. The metric is implemented in simulated
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and real-world traffic scenarios incorporating vehicles of car-
like kinematics, as well as pedestrians of single-integration
kinematics.
A. Related Work
The definition of multi-agent safety is dependent upon
the cooperative pattern of all participating agents [8]. If
one assumes the agents are all absolutely cooperative in
avoiding potential conflicts, the optimal reciprocal collision
avoidance (ORCA) [9] method and its extensions[10], [11]
provide the safety guarantees for an arbitrary differential-
drive agent operating in a non-homogeneous multi-agent
system, with all agents following a consensus strategy. For
on-road vehicle operation, traffic rules and responsibility
recognition can also be considered as a consensus strategy
to achieve cooperative collision avoidance. On the other
hand, if all agents are independent in making planning and
control decisions, the safety evaluation problem under such a
non-cooperative assumption is closely related to reachability
analysis (RA) originated from differential game and optimal
control theory. RA provides theoretical guarantees for the
safety properties of nonlinear control systems [12]. It has been
widely adopted in designing safety-critical motion planning
algorithms in various differential games [13], [14], as well
as mobile robots [15] in engineering practice. In particular,
Althoff et al. [16] have studied the safe operable space of ADS
through propagating the forward reachable set with various
constraints. The concept has been further extended to various
sub-problems within the research domain of ADS safety [17].
However, in general, applying RA in analyzing the safety
properties of ADS is computationally intensive and would
require strict assumptions as well as various approximations
to work in even simple scenarios.
For the particular problem of automated vehicle safety
evaluation in practice, various methods have been proposed
with real-time computational efficiency. The responsibility-
sensitive safety (RSS) metric [19] is conceptually close to
the approximation of the backward reachability set (BRS).
A series of scenario-specific rules are established with
respect to various perspectives in real-life driving, including
responsibility, traffic laws, right-of-way rules, and object
visibility. This essentially enables the method in practice
to approximate a safety bound of actions within which the
SV is safe. However, the method significantly simplifies the
motion kinematics and is not a continuous metric regarding
the safety status of the SV. Another similar approach is the
safety force field [20], which conceptually approximates the
control barrier. Junietz et al. [21] recently proposed a model-
based safety evaluation method for automated vehicles by
selecting a target function representing the criticality (safety)
level of a potential trajectory. The safety evaluation task
then becomes a trajectory optimization problem, specifically,
a quadratic programming problem with linear constraints,
which comes with tractable solutions. However, the safety
analysis of such form can become very sensitive to how the
safety criterion is determined. The notion of criticality is only
monotonic with respect to a certain safety status induced
by the design of the target function. It does not necessarily
indicate the rigorous closeness to a potential collision.
B. Organization
Section II provides preliminaries for our method, including
the analytic definition of safety used for this metric. Sec-
tion III formally introduces MPrISM and details of MPrISM
for ADS safety evaluation. Various examples showing the
capability and effectiveness of MPrISM are presented in
Section IV. Section V summarizes the paper and provides
some considerations for possible future work.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
We formulate the general problem of ADS safety analysis
in a non-homogeneous differential-drive multi-agent system
with partially non-cooperative traffic agents.
A. The Differential-drive Agents
Consider the general motion of an intelligent agent denoted
by the subscript i satisfying
9xi “ fipxi,ui, tq, (1)
where the agent state xi P Xi Ď RNpiq, action ui P Ui Ď
RMpiq and the function fi : Xi ˆ Ui ˆ R Ñ Xi. Given the
multi-agent system is non-homogeneous, all agents do not
necessarily share the same admissible actions space. Here we
assume they all have the same dimensions of actions with
Mpiq “M,@i. We also assume all agents operate within the
Euclidean plane, i.e., the state xi contains at least the two-
dimensional coordinates ppi, qiq and Npiq ě 2. In practice,
both states and actions can be bounded and sometimes are
of periodic dimension (e.g., heading angle), we consider R
for simplification.
Presented with an initial condition xip0q, let xi “
gipxi,ui, tq be the solution of (1) where gi : XiˆUiˆRÑ
Xi. Given an arbitrarily small step size ∆, one can numerically
approximate the solution through the Runge-Kutta method,
i.e.,
x1i “ grki pxi,ui,∆q (2)
where x1i approximates the state at t “ ∆ from executing
action ui for state xi at t “ 0. A more detailed formulation
of vehicle and pedestrian motion following (1) and (2) will
be addressed in Section III.
B. The Definition of Safety
Generally, relative distance determines collision and colli-
sion avoidance implies safety. Consider the system of multi-
agent interactions among k`1 agents of various types having
the state x “ txiui“0,1,...,k with xi “ rpi, qis being the
Euclidean position of the i-th agent. The index 0 denotes the
SV. The collision set is then defined as
ΩC “ tx | inf
i“1,2,...,ktdpxi,x0qu ď Cu. (3)
That is, a collision is determined to occur if and only if
there exists at least one principal other agent whose relative
distance measured through the metric dp¨, ¨q with respect to
the test subject is smaller or equal to a given constant C.
Throughout this paper, we adopt the Euclidean distance as
the distance metric, i.e., dpxi,x0q “ ‖xi ´ x0‖2.
We also consider the following assumption that is com-
monly accepted in robotics motion planning [11] and is also
valid in the engineering practice of automotive research.
Assumption 2.1: All participating agents share a common
and constant sensing-action cycle that is the same as the
selected step size ∆ for numerical approximation of (1).
Starting at time t, each agent selects a control action
uptq P Uptq from its admissible action space and consistently
executes the same action throughout the time interval of
rt, t`∆q. Furthermore, the admissible action space within
such time interval also remains the same as Uptq.
Given the approximated solution (2), we seek to justify the
safety status of the SV by evaluating whether it maintains
the capability of staying outside the collision set with
appropriately selected trajectory of T steps of actions u¯ “
u¯pT q :“ rup0q, . . . ,upT ´ 1qs, u¯ P ΠTn“1Uipt ` pn ´ 1q∆q
within time period of T∆ regardless of how other participating
agents behave.
C. Partially Non-cooperative Collision Avoidance
Generally, one has to assume all participating agents are
non-cooperative, in order to provide absolute safety guarantees
for navigating in the multi-agent system. However, as pointed
out by various previous work [19], such an assumption is
often too strong to hold in practice. As illustrated in Fig. 4, the
SV becomes safety-critical easily in the boxed-in scenario if
all surrounding vehicles decide to be aggressive. In this paper,
we consider a more relaxed but also practical assumption
of the partially non-cooperative pattern as follows. Similar
assumptions have been made in previous work without being
specifically defined [19], [22].
Assumption 2.2: Among k principal other agents, there
exists at most one non-cooperative agent and all other agents
will comply with the SV to avoid collisions.
In the illustrated example from Fig. 4, consider the case
where the lead principal other vehicle (POV) performs an
abrupt brake, enforcing the following SV to execute braking
to escape. Assumption 2.2 states that the rear-POV will also
brake to comply, and the two side-POVs will not initiate any
trajectories that would make the situation worse. Notice that
the SV does not hold any information regarding the identity
of the non-cooperative agent other than the existence of such
an agent among k traffic objects.
Given Assumption 2.2, the SV can perform the safety
check with respect to each traffic object individually and take
the worst case among all results obtained. Let hipx,u, tq “
‖xi ´ x0‖2 be the relative distance between the i-th traffic
agent and the SV, hpx,u, tq “ mini“1,2,...,kthipx,u, tqu. We
conclude this section with the definition of safety in navigating
in the non-homogeneous, differential drive, and partially non-
cooperative multi-agent system. It will also shed light on the
safety evaluation metric introduced in this paper.
Definition 2.3: Consider the collision defined as (3) with
assumptions of 2.1 and 2.2. Let
hi˚ px,u, t, T,∆q “ min
u¯i
max
u¯0
phipx,u, t` T∆qq (4)
The SV is defined as being safe with xptq R ΩC within the
time interval of rt, t` T∆q, T ą 0 if @i P t1, 2, ..., ku,@n P
t1, 2, ..., T u,
hi˚ px,u, t, n,∆q ě C. (5)
Intuitively, the minimax optimization of (4) induces the
optimal outcome available for the SV when presented with
the worst scenario. If such an optimal outcome is not a
collision (identified by (5)), the SV is considered safe by
the definition above. Generally, the optimization problem is
computationally complex, considering the highly nonlinear
motion of (1) and the admissible action space Ui is often state-
dependent and time-variant in engineering practice. However,
as we will show in Section III, through local linearization
of various motion kinematics, one can achieve a tractable
solution of (4) under standard assumptions, specifically for
purposes of evaluating ADS safety performance broadly.
III. MODEL PREDICTIVE INSTANTANEOUS SAFETY
METRIC
We first describe the formal MPrISM algorithm. For the
specific implementation of an ADS safety evaluation, through
linearizing the vehicle and pedestrian motion kinematics, one
can then simplify the proposed MPrISM algorithm to solving
a series of minimax quadratic optimization problems under
linear constraints.
A. The Derived Method
Given the system state xptq at time t consisting of one SV
and k traffic agents, referred to as a snapshot, Algorithm 1
determines the notion of "time-to-collision" τ in the Euclidean
operable domain.
Algorithm 1 Model Predictive Time to Collision for a Given
Snapshot
1: Input: Snapshot xptq, step size ∆, collision set defined
as (3), look-ahead steps T .
2: for i “ 1, . . . , k do
3: Indicator of collision c “ False
4: for j “ 1, . . . , T do
5: τi “ j∆
6: if hi˚ px,u, t, j,∆q ď C then
7: c “ True
8: break
9: end if
10: end for
11: if c is False then
12: τi “ τi `∆
13: end if
14: end for
15: Output: τ “ min
i“1,...,ktτiu
The derived τ from the above algorithm is referred to as
the Model Predictive Time-to-Collision (MPrTTC) in this
paper. This is in contrast with the classic TTC [3] where only
the one-dimensional longitudinal motion is considered.
It is immediate that τ “ T∆ if the SV is collision-free
within the time period of rt, t ` T∆q. For τ ă T∆, τ
represents the approximated time to collision of the SV when
presented with the worst set of actions by the traffic agents
going ahead from the current scenario snapshot. For the rest
of this paper, we say the SV is safe if τ “ T∆ (i.e., no
collision would occur per Definition 2.3 within T∆ seconds
in the future) and the SV is unsafe otherwise.
Given a time series of L snapshots, referred to as a scenario,
one can perform various statistical propagations to analyze
the overall performance of the SV in terms of safety.
B. Traffic Motion Kinematics
We further address details of vehicle and pedestrian
kinematics to help simplify the optimization of (4).
1) Vehicle kinematics: Given the nonlinear vehicle kine-
matics of
9x““ 9p 9q 9v 9φ‰T ““v cos pφq v sin pφq ax ayv ‰T ,
(6)
with world coordinates pp, qq, velocity v, heading angle φ
and control actions of u “ rax, ays. Assume small course
angle and change of velocity, one can linearize the kinematics
with a constant velocity v˜ as
9x “ “ 9p 9q 9v 9φ‰T « “v v˜φ ax ayv˜ ‰T . (7)
We also have the Runge-Kutta approximation with step size
∆ of
x1 “ Avx`Bvu,x “ rp, q, v, φsT ,u “ rax, aysT ,
Av “
»——–
1 0 ∆ 0
0 1 0 v˜∆
0 0 1 0
0 0 0 1
fiffiffifl ,Bv “
»——–
∆2
2 0
0 ∆
2
2
∆ 0
0 ∆v˜
fiffiffifl . (8)
Notice that the admissible action space U of a general vehicle
is dependent upon various factors. While we assume the
action space remains the same throughout the T steps of
propagation for safety evaluation, the action space Upv, η, tq
is initialized as a function of the vehicle type η and the
current velocity v. Fig. 1 shows the maximum longitudinal
acceleration amaxx as an approximated polynomial function
of v and η for v ě 0. The data is collected and analyzed
from real tests with a selected set of 6 representative vehi-
cles. These vehicles consisted of 3 battery-electric vehicles
and 3 combustion engine powered vehicles since the two
powertrains demonstrate significantly different acceleration
profiles. Different acceleration profiles represent a difference
in control capabilities, which may lead to different MPrISM
scores for the same traffic snapshot. The lateral acceleration
bound aminy , a
max
y and the maximum deceleration a
min
x are
not shown in Fig. 1, but are also determined with respect to
v and η. We also approximate the ellipse acceleration map
with a dodecagon following the similar method from [21]
Fig. 1: Approximating the admissible action space of vehicles
with respect to the vehicle type and current speed. The black
dot can be replaced by any of the values shown in the right
subplot, given the vehicle type and the current speed.
(partially illustrated within one quadrant in Fig. 1). This can
be formulated as 12 inequality constraints as follows for the
action taken at T “ 1 in the optimization problem of (4).
Notice that the lateral action bound satisfies |aminy | “ |amaxy |.»——–
Lminx L
max
y
Lminx ´Lmaxy
´Lmaxx Lmaxy
´Lmaxx ´Lmaxy
fiffiffiflu ď bxy,bxy “
»–sin 5pi12. . .
sin 5pi12
fifl ,
Lminx “
»—–
6
5|aminx | cos
7pi
12
6
5|aminx | cos
9pi
12
6
5|aminx | cos
11pi
12
fiffifl ,Lmaxy “
»—–
1
|amaxy | sin
7pi
12
1
|amaxy | sin
9pi
12
1
|amaxy | sin
11pi
12
fiffifl .
(9)
We emphasize that the admissible action space can be
easily extended to include other constraints with respect to
various factors of traffic rules, speed limit, ethical concerns,
responsibility, etc.
2) Pedestrian kinematics: We adopt the Dubins-car-like
model with mild modifications in approximating the kinemat-
ics of the pedestrian as follows.
9x “
»– 9p9q
9φ
fifl “
»–v cos pφqv sin pφq
γ
fifl . (10)
The pedestrian can reach a instantaneous velocity of
v P r0, 3m{ss and heading angle rate of γ P
r´0.3rad{s, 0.3rad{ss. Assume small course angle change,
we can linearize the model and numerically approximate the
solution as
x1 “ Apx`Bpu,x “ rp, q, φsT ,u “ rv, γsT
Ap “
»–1 0 00 1 0
0 0 1
fifl ,Bp “
»–∆ 00 v˜∆22
0 ∆
fifl (11)
While we only study the motion of vehicles and pedestrians
in this section, the method can easily generalize to a broad
category of traffic objects through altering the admissible
action space.
C. The Minimax Quadratic Optimization Formulation
For a multi-agent system of various vehicles and pedestrians
where a certain vehicle is selected as the SV, we can rewrite
the target function hipx,u, t ` T∆q for the optimization
problem of (4) as∥∥∥Aˆixiptq ` Bˆituiptqu ´ Aˆ0x0ptq ´ Bˆ0tu0ptqu∥∥∥
2
, (12)
where Aˆ “ pAqT and Bˆ “ “AT´1B . . . AB B‰. Aˆ P
RNˆN and Bˆ P RNˆTˆM . This can be further propagated
to the form of
min
u¯i
max
u¯0
u¯Ti Pu¯i`u¯T0 Qu¯0`u¯Ti Ru¯0`UT u¯i`VT u¯0`H
subject to Liu¯i ď bi,L0u¯0 ď b0,
(13)
where P and Q are positive definite. The inequality con-
straints are mainly determined by the action space of the
participating agents. We can also extend the constraints
considering the drivable space, traffic rules, responsibility,
etc.
To this end, we have reduced the MPrISM algorithm
to solving a series of the minimax quadratic optimization
problems of (13). Let the optimization target be Jp¨q, (13)
can be solved with alternating gradient descent (AGD) as
u¯i Ð u¯i ´ ρOu¯iJp¨q, and u¯0 Ð u¯0 ` µOu¯0Jp¨q, (14)
with projection handling the constraints conditions. Generally,
given the maximization target is convex, (13) is essentially
non-convex optimization, AGD only guarantees the conver-
gence to a local optimal solution. However, the quadratic
form in (12) is of a particular structure that would provide
efficient global optimal convergence with tractable solutions.
Let the critical point be u¯˚ :“ ru¯0˚ , u¯i˚ s “ argminu¯Jp¨q,
and the convex set induced by the linear inequalities be
Λ :“ tu¯|Liu¯i ď bi,L0u¯0 ď b0u. Consider the following
two cases.
Case 1: If u¯˚ R Λ, (4) becomes convex optimization and
AGD guarantees the convergence to the global optimum. In
the specific practice of an ADS safety evaluation, this implies
that the action from the traffic object to initiate the worst-case
scenario and the optimal response from the SV to escape
from such a worst-case both lie on the boundary of each
agent’s action profile. Most of the cases one would encounter
during the ADS safety evaluation satisfy such a condition
hence can be solved efficiently with AGD.
Case 2: On the other hand, if u¯˚ P Λ, the optimization
becomes non-convex. While the optimal action trajectory
for the SV still lies on the boundary of the action profile,
it requires considering the full control authority of the
traffic object to determine the optimal attacking trajectory.
In practice, the number of such cases is limited, given the
condition requires a relatively close distance between the two
participants. While slower than AGD in the convex setting, a
tractable solution can still be obtained through the branch-
and-bound technique that guarantees the convergence to the
global optimum.
Fig. 2: Running frequency of MPrISM with respect to the
number of traffic objects empirically evaluated using single-
process and multi-process (8 workers)
One can also adopt various accelerated gradient descent
methods [24] to facilitate optimization. Notice that Algo-
rithm 1 also naturally supports parallel computation. In
practice, the algorithm is efficient for various applications of
ADS safety evaluation. Details are described in Section IV.
IV. EXAMPLES
The implementation of the proposed MPrISM metric for
ADS safety evaluation is empirically illustrated with three
types of examples, the snapshot, the scenario, and the on-road
test. The snapshot is provided as a fixed time instance. A
scenario describes a testing procedure for automated vehicles.
The SV is deployed in a contained environment with a set
of traffic objects following the pre-determined or conditional
motion trajectories. The on-road test further extends the
scenario to bigger maps with more complex flows of traffic.
Throughout the examples shown in this section, we use
the same set of MPrISM parameters of C “ 2,∆ “ 0.1,
T “ 10. That is, we consider the collision as a circled region
of 2m in radius with respect to a certain selected center of the
SV. Furthermore, we have τ P t0, 0.1, . . . , 1u, propagating
the time to collision within the one-second look-ahead time
period (τ “ 1 if it is collision-free). We implement the
algorithm in Python. With the Intel Xeon 3.4GHz CPU core,
Fig. 2 illustrates the empirical performance of MPrISM for
single-process and multi-process (8 workers) given repeatedly
sampled snapshots with various number of traffic objects. In
practice, a traffic scene leading to a certain fatal accident
typically involves no more than 5 participants [5]. This leads
to a processing rate of over 20 snapshots per second with 5
traffic objects in each snapshot under multi-process.
A. Snapshots
We assume identical vehicles for all snapshots studied in
this section. Fig. 3 illustrates the MPrISM analysis results of
vehicle-to-vehicle and vehicle-to-pedestrian interactions with
respect to a selected pair of variables.
For the Lead-POV Following snapshots (Fig. 3(a)), SV
is safe when it is traveling at a lower velocity than the
lead-POV. As SV increases its speed along with the lead-
POV decreasing the speed, the snapshot becomes less safe
(smaller MPrTTC). In the Oncoming Left-turning POV cases
(Fig. 3(b)), SV is safe when it has a higher velocity than
the slower moving rear POV. The situation becomes less
Fig. 3: Various snapshots safety analysis: (a) The "Lead-POV
Following" Snapshots, (b) The "Oncoming Left-turning POV"
Snapshots, (c) The "Perpendicularly Passing Pedestrian"
Snapshots, (d) The "Oncoming Pedestrian" Snapshots
safe with decreasing SV velocity and increasing rear-POV
velocity. Given the configuration of the Perpendicularly
Passing Pedestrian snapshots (Fig. 3(c)), the pedestrian is
more likely to initiate a potential collision from the right side
of the vehicle. On the other side, the pedestrian holds equal
capability to cause a potential collision on both sides of the
SV in the analysis of the Oncoming Pedestrian snapshots.
We also study a group of snapshots in the boxed-in scenario
where the SV is surrounded by 4 identical traffic vehicles
(Fig. 4). We study the MPrISM results with respect to four
SV controlled variables, including the longitudinal offset,
the lateral offset, the velocity, and the heading angle. We
perform MPrISM analysis on a total of 2079 snapshots among
which we have 571 snapshots considered unsafe (Fig. 5).
Following the partially non-cooperative assumption of 2.2
and Algorithm 1, one can derive the specific traffic object
that dominates the crash through argmini“1,...,ktτiu. Within
the 571 unsafe snapshots, the front-POV, the rear-POV and
the left-POV dominate 101, 140 and 330 potential collisions,
respectively. Notice that we only set the choices of heading
angle to the left side of the SV.
When the SV matches velocity with the group of POVs
at 25m{s with the same heading angle, the situation is safe
regardless of the choices of positioning offset, leading to an
empty subplot as shown by the far-right column, middle row
in Fig. 5. SV tends to experience more unsafe snapshots at
higher velocity (30m{s), as well as a higher deviation from
the zero heading angle (´7.5˝).
Overall, the MPrISM analysis of various snapshots align
with the general intuitive notion of safe driving behaviors,
and the numeric results provide objective details that would
enhance our understanding regarding the safety evaluation of
ADS. The capability of MPrISM to serve as a safety scoring
system in practice is shown in the following examples of
traffic scenarios.
Fig. 4: The boxed-in snapshots with four controlled variables.
Fig. 5: The boxed-in safety analysis with unsafe cases only.
B. Traffic Scenarios
Three traffic scenarios are studied in this section (Fig. 6(a)).
The "suddenly revealed stopped vehicle" (SRSV) is a standard
testing scenario with data collected from real-world tests.
The "highway exit" and the "emergent single lane change"
are deployed in the VIRES VTD simulator. The admissible
action space is customized with respect to the type of vehicle
involved.
1) The suddenly revealed stopped vehicle: The objective
of the SRSV test is to evaluate the traffic jam assist (TJA)
system’s performance in detecting and properly responding
to a stationary POV that is suddenly revealed after another
Fig. 6: Various traffic scenarios configurations: (a) The "sud-
denly revealed stopped vehicle" (SRSV), (b) The "highway
exit" and (c) The "emergent single lane change".
Fig. 7: MPrISM analysis comparing two vehicles in the SRSV
scenario where Vehicle 2 ends up with a collision.
lead POV steers to the side. All data analyzed in this scenario
was collected from real vehicle tests on two commercially
available vehicles equipped with the TJA system. Vehicle 2
(Fig. 7) failed the test with a collision. For both vehicles,
MPrISM analysis shows MPrTTC values greater than 1
throughout the first stage when SV is following the lead-POV.
The comparison between two vehicles in the brake-to-stop
stage is shown in Fig. 7. Vehicle 1 manages to brake to a stop
without a collision. This aligns with the MPrISM analysis
where no MPrTTC results are plotted, indicating that no
collision would occur within the 1-second imminent future
from any time step throughout the test. For Vehicle 2, the
MPrTTC turns to 0.2 at 0.23s before the actual collision,
indicating an MPrTTC of τ “ 0.2s for the SV when presented
with the worst-case scenario. Currently, NCAP [25] like
testing procedures and scenarios are designed for validating
low-level algorithms. Test data collected in these tests can be
partially analyzed by observing collision results and applying
the classic TTC metric. The following scenarios are provided
to show the performance of MPrISM in more complicated
tests regarding evaluating high-level planning and control
algorithms.
2) The highway exit: This scenario takes place on a three-
lane highway. The SV begins in the left-most lane and is
trying to navigate to the highway exit on the right lane through
two POVS in the middle lane. Generally, the path planning
algorithm would select one of the three possible trajectories
of performing the dual-lane change maneuver; pass in the
front of (DLC-F), through the middle (DLC-M), or on the
rear (DLC-R) of the two POVs. With the appropriate setup,
all of the options could get through the test with acceptable
performance in terms of utility (reaching the exit on time
without breaking traffic rules or causing any collisions). Here
we analyze them using MPrISM. The scenario starts with
the two POVs maintaining the same lane following behavior
throughout the test. All vehicle states are recorded at 50Hz.
For each test, we select the time when the SV reaches the
center of the middle lane as t “ 0 and take all vehicle
states within the time range of r´4s, 3ss. From Fig. 8,it is
shown that the DLC-R had an MPrTTC value greater than
1 for the entire scenario. Although both DLC-F and DLC-
M achieved about the same minimum relative distance at
the same maximum velocity, MPrISM is able to catch the
geometric difference of the specific traffic snapshot, which
Fig. 8: Safety analysis of the highway exit scenario, the
distance shown in the second plot is measured as the relative
lateral distance between the SV and the laterally nearest POV.
Fig. 9: Safety analysis of SV and POV1 in the emergent
single lane change scenario.
shows that the DLC-M scenario results in smaller MPrTCC
values. These values, resulting from the MPrISM method,
hold potential for safety evaluations. In this example, the
MPrTCC values suggest DLC-R is safer than either DLC-F
or DLC-M, with DLC-F slightly safer than DLC-M. .
3) Emergent single lane change: The scenario of the
emergent single lane change is shown in Fig. 6(c). A similar
case was also studied in the previous work of [26] from the
criticality perspective. The MPrTTC and vehicle states are
shown in Fig. 9. In addition to studying safety from the SV
perspective, we also consider the POV1 as the test subject
with MPrISM analysis. It is interesting to observe that POV
1 has lower MPrTCC values than the SV vehicle, suggesting
it experienced a more dangerous situation that the SV based
on the MPrISM results. This also aligns with the general
intuition that the POV1 is the more aggressive agent in this
scenario.
C. On-road Driving Simulation
Another venue for demonstrating MPrISM results is
simulated on-road driving. For this, we simulate naturalistic
on-road driving in SUMO [27] with two automated driving
algorithms deployed on the same set of maps through the same
traffic scenarios operating for the same amount of time. Table I
lists the details of the simulation setup. Driver 1 is designed
to be more aggressive than the Driver 2. Throughout the
12000-second simulation, neither of the drivers was reported
with collisions or disobeying traffic rules.
From Table II, given that Driver 1 stays being unsafe for
longer period of time then Driver 2. This aligns with the
TABLE I: Parameters of map, traffic, and automated driving
algorithms for SUMO simulation of the on-road driving.
SUMO setup Driver setup
Edges 57614 Model Driver 1 Driver 2
Lanes 60930 minGap 0.5 3
Junctions 86 sigma 1 0.5
Distance(km) 738.564 tau 0.1 2
3 Lane Edges 158 emergencyDecel 4 6
2 Lane Edges 2794 lcStrategic 105 1
Vehicle flows 18 lcSpeedGain 106 1
Vehicles 602 lcKeepRight 100 1
Pedestrian flows 7 lcOvertakeRight 100 1
Step size 0.02s lcOpposite 1000 1
lcAssertive 1000 1
TABLE II: Safety comparison of two intelligent drivers in
the on-road test.
Model Driver 1 Driver 2
Total running time (s) 12000
Total running distance (km) 151.38 161.6
Average ax (m{s2) -0.001 0.004
Average number of near traffic vehicles 1.641 1.53
Total time of being unsafe (s) 111.64 96.4
Mean ax when unsafe (m{s2) -0.258 -0.064
setup shown in Table I where Driver 1 is designed to be
more aggressive. Also, one interesting observation is that
even though the overall acceleration of both drivers remain
close, Driver 1 tends to perform more extreme maneuvers
(deceleration with higher magnitude) when it is operating in
the unsafe status judged by MPrISM.
V. CONCLUSION
A testing metric for planning and control performance
evaluation of ADS is introduced. The metric determines the
time to a collision of the subject vehicle, given the worst
possible scenario with respect to various choices of actions.
It objectively scores the performance of an automated driving
system. The implementation of the MPrISM method is shown
through numerical examples, simulated testing scenarios, and
real-world vehicle tests.
While the proposed metric is derived in a modeled manner
with deterministic dynamic transitions and explicit actuation
constraints, it is worth mentioning that the metric is still
compatible with probability techniques for risk assessment.
For example, one can impose a particular probability distri-
bution over various action profiles and establish a weighted
summary of the MPrISM results for each profile. However,
this is out of the scope of this paper and is of interest for
future work. Other future efforts could consider extending
the target function of (12) with more factors. Some of such
changes would potentially affect the nature of the optimization
target, but could also make a more representative term for
safety.
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